This is the accepted version of a paper published in Journal of Modern African Studies. This paper has been peer-reviewed but does not include the final publisher proof-corrections or journal pagination. contributes to the literature on state-building and peace-building in war-torn societies, by exploring how the extreme levels of violence are linked to three groups of factors. First, the stakes involved in being part of the government are extremely high, since it is the only way to secure political and economic influence. Second, the actors involved in political life are dominated by individuals who held positions within the rebel groups, which increase the risk of political differences turning violent. Third, the institutions important for a legitimate electoral process, and which work to prevent violence, are weak or non-existent.
INTRODUCTION
On 15 December 2013, fighting between different factions of the presidential guard broke out in Juba, the capital of the world's newest nation, South Sudan. The conflict spread rapidly and killed more than 10,000 people (ICG 2014) . Within only a few months, over 1 million had been displaced, with approximately 950,000 people internally displaced in South Sudan and close to 300,000 having fled to neighbouring countries (Amnesty International 2014). The fighting included massacres where people were targeted because of their ethnicity, with the main dividing line being between the Dinka and Nuer. The Dinka constitutes South Sudan's largest ethnic group, to which President Salva Kiir belongs, while the Nuer are the second largest group and also the ethnic affiliation of the rebel leader Riek Machar (UNMISS 2014) . Fears about a 'next Rwanda' were raised (Sudan Tribune 30.4.2014) .
This article seeks to contribute to research on post-war governance and conflict in South Sudan by advancing our understanding of links between violence and electoral politics.
These aspects remain largely unexplored and previous analyses of violence in South Sudan focus instead the dynamics of the war and road to independence, predation and kleptocracy (de Waal 2014; Johnson 2012; LeRiche & Arnold 2012; Pinaud 2014) . This is surprising given that the 2010 election in South Sudan had clear connections to several violent conflicts, both insurgent challenges against the central regime in Juba and more localised communal conflicts.
In the article, we build on previous research on South Sudan Theoretically, this article contributes to the expanding research agenda on elections and violence in post-war societies (Bekoe 2012; Brancanti & Snyder 2013; Jarstad & Sisk 2006; Lyons 2005) . By studying South Sudan, we develop the theoretical understanding of electoral politics in societies transitioning from war. Given its recently gained status as an independent state, South Sudan faces a dual predicament. South Sudan has not only been struggling to achieve peace, but also to build a viable state. The parallel processes of state-building and peace-building require a framework that considers key factors from both these perspectives.
However, much of the literature on electoral processes in Africa's transitioning societies analyses democratisation, state-building and peace-building processes as separate phenomena (e.g. Boone 2003; Bratton & de Valle; 1997; Lindberg 2006; Lyons 2005; Mamdani 1996) . We therefore make use of a conceptual framework which is structured around three key components: stakes, actors and institutions. The framework was developed to identify the conflict-inducing aspects of elections in countries which have introduced multiparty-democracy in a post-war period ). Our analysis of South Sudan represents a first empirical application of the theoretical framework.
The analysis yields several important insights. First, the stakes in the elections in South Sudan are extraordinarily high, since a position within the government is principally the only way to safeguard political and economic influence. Second, a majority of the actors involved in the elections were associated with the rebel movements during the previous civil war, which increases the risk that they will choose a violent path over non-violent politics. Third, key institutions -including election management bodies and political parties -are very weak and in some cases non-existent. This encourages manipulation of institutions to further partisan interests, and the ability of institutions to prevent or mitigate the risk of violence is extremely low.
The analysis also shed light on the continuities and discontinuities from the NorthSouth war. We argue that the end of the longstanding war of independence and the formation of a new state have created (or reintroduced) new dividing lines which have reignited power struggles at the elite level. At the same time, the legacies of violent conflict linger: parties and institutions are weak, weapons abound, and there is a violent political culture nurtured by the war. Moreover, prevailing hostile relations between Sudan and South Sudan mean that challengers of the regime in Juba have an accessible source of support, including weapons. In this context, the introduction of electoral politics has spawned new conflicts, with a major propensity for violence.
This article is divided into four parts. First, we briefly discuss previous research on violence, elections, peace-building and state-building and outline our theoretical approach.
Second, we describe electoral politics and patterns of violence in South Sudan. Third, we apply the conceptual framework and analyse the influence of actors, stakes and institutions on the connection between elections and the violence in South Sudan. Fourth, in our concluding remarks we discuss the interlinkages between the three factors, identify key conflict-generating aspects and some insights for further research.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND THEORETICAL APPROACH
Two research trends have served to further our understanding of the challenges that peaceful politics face in war-torn countries. A first strand highlights the dilemmas encountered in warto-peace transitions and focuses on the structural features of societies shattered by armed conflict. For instance, institutions and party structures are weak, civil society is generally politicised or has minimal influence, spoilers set on ruining the peace process are present, infrastructure is poor and there is dependence on large-scale international involvement (Brancanti & Snyder 2013; Jarstad & Sisk 2006; Paris 2004; Lyons 2005) . These conditions make the advent of multi-party politics and the institutions sustaining democracy precarious.
Moreover, war-to-peace transitions are often accompanied by state-building processes, emphasising the necessity to develop capable and legitimate state institutions to underpin the conduct of democratic politics. While a necessary step, this introduces further difficult conditions since institution-building in essence requires not only fundamental reform, but also time (Paris & Sisk 2009 ). Taken together, this research has pointed to the conflict-inducing aspects of elections, especially in times of transition.
A second strand focuses more directly on violent electoral competition and views violence as a strategy parallel to other constitutional or non-constitutional strategies, which governments and opposition parties use to further their influence during electoral periods.
Election-related violence has been studied both as a strategic form of political violence used by elites and as more grass-root driven processes, including ethnic rioting and violent protest.
Part of this research stresses the features of the electoral process, in particular the incentive structures shaped by institutional weakness and constitutional constraints, the electoral system, electoral management bodies and the nature of international involvement (Hafner-Burton et al. 2010; Daxecker 2012; Arriola & Johnson, unpublished paper; Fjelde & Höglund 2014 ). For instance, Wilkinson's (2004) study on ethnic riots in India suggests that electoral incentives at the town level explain where Muslim-Hindu riots break out, whereas state-level electoral motivations decide if the police will be called in to prevent riots.
Other studies emphasise more general features of society, such as the combination of social cleavages and patrimonialism. Patrimonialism is a feature of societies which increases the stakes of elections, especially when intertwined with societal features which price ethnicity as the most important political asset (Arriola 2009 ). The importance of patrimonial politics for electoral conflicts can be witnessed, for example, in Kenya, Zimbabwe and Côte d'Ivoire, where local land grievances are used by opportunistic politicians for their own political purposes (Boone 2012; Boone & Krieger 2012) . Conflicts between Christians and Muslims in Indonesia have been based on patronage networks and clientelism, where the triggering factor was the upcoming election (Van Klinken 2001) . These studies point to the interlinkages between the formal political arena and the informal structures which are used by political elites to gain and maintain power.
This article adopts a novel approach to studying the violence-election nexus in South Sudan. Our conceptual framework builds on insights from previous research and suggests three sets of factors which have been emphasised as important features in explaining the conflictgenerating dynamics of elections: stakes, actors, and institutions ). While other factors also come into play, such as ethnic and socioeconomic configurations in the country, resource scarcity or path dependency, the theoretical framework is useful to capture the dynamics in South Sudan, since its constituent components include factors of relevance both from a peace-building and state-building perspective.
Stakes highlight the price attached to winning elections. The likelihood of elections becoming violent is premised on the importance of the elections. In transitioning countries, the stakes of elections are generally higher than in consolidated democracies. Access to state power becomes a means to secure personal wealth and provide significant benefits for one's own constituency (Bratton & van de Walle 1997; Posner 2005) . Presidential and governmental power is of particular importance, especially in highly centralised states, since control of the state's economic resources is exercised at the centre. In non-democratic countries, state assets can also be used to oppress political opponents to gain an advantage during times of election.
For instance, the police and military may be manipulated to make extra-legal arrests of regime critics, break up political meetings of opposition parties, or intimidate opposition voters and candidates.
Actors point to a component that deals with the political players involved in the electoral process. Political parties are considered the key agents in electoral processes, because they establish the link between the voter and the institutions of democracy. In countries emerging from violent conflict, the main political actors are generally strongly militarised.
While non-militant political parties may exist, many of the electoral competitors may be formerly armed actors who only recently became formal political parties. In addition, in many developing countries the political parties are fairly weakly institutionalised and have insufficient resources (Diamond 1999; Panebianco 1988; Randall & Svåsand 2002) . This holds true in many war-torn societies as well. The main challenge from the perspective of violence, is the involvement of militants in politics. Democratic, non-violent behaviour and norms take time to develop. The risk is considerable that violence will be used as a means to repress opponents, or, if faced with electoral loss or political marginalisation, take up arms (Lyons 2005; Manning 2007; Söderberg Kovacs 2008) .
Institutions emphasise the structures of the state in which elections take place. The institutional framework -including the electoral system, the electoral law, electoral management bodies (EMBs), police and judiciary -determines the rules of the game in electoral politics. A key issue to consider with regard to institutions and conflict management in a postwar context is the extent to which the institutions increase polarisation by excluding important actors with the capacity to foment violence. The representativeness of institutions such as the executive, parliament and local government is, for instance, influenced by the type of electoral system. Majoritarian systems may to a larger extent than proportional ones encourage winnertakes-all dynamics and create permanent minorities, which may have a violence-inducing influence on electoral politics (e.g. Lindberg 2005; Reynolds 1999; Sisk 1996) . 2 The representativeness of key institutions, such as EMBs, the police and judiciary, is also fundamentally determined by appointment and recruitment processes, which may be based on political considerations and partisan interest, rather than merit. A second aspect of importance relates to the capability and independence of institutions to fulfil the roles they are meant to perform. For instance, electoral laws may be designed to prevent militant actors from standing in elections and may prohibit 'hate speech' that might encourage violent mobilisation.
However, if the police and judiciary are weak or politicised and thereby unable to enforce the laws, these laws will have little influence on behaviour around elections.
We seek to trace the connection between election and violence in a broad sense. We do not confine our study to violence in the immediate proximity to elections, but include violence prior to and after the elections. We also analyse both communal and state-based armed conflicts, and the extent to which they are interwoven with electoral dynamics. 3 For this reason, we do not use the term electoral violence, which is considered a specific form of political violence in much of the academic literature (Höglund 2009; Daxecker 2012) . Communal conflicts constitute 'conflicts between non-state groups that are organised along a shared communal identity', while state-based conflict is a 'conflict with a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory … between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state' (UCDP 2014). In our study we focus primarily on the conflicts which originate in relationships between the elites, but throughout the analysis we highlight the interlinkages to local conflict dynamics (Kalyvas 2006) . Moreover, the South Sudan case points to an additional factor with regard to institutions which is important to consider. In states completely dominated by one political party, the real political competition takes place within the party, rather than at the actual elections.
ELECTORAL POLITICS AND PATTERNS OF VIOLENCE IN SOUTH SUDAN
On 9 
The 2010 elections
The interim period opened up for electoral competition within South Sudan as a political unit.
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The April 2010 elections were stipulated in the CPA and the international community believed that the elections would foster a democratic culture in Sudan (Thomas 2009; Willis et al. 2009 ).
However, many analysts were hesitant about the advisability of elections because they were seen as potentially destabilising. Given the low levels of trust between the signatories of the agreement, and deep divisions within Sudan and South Sudan, it was suggested that elections would foster new conflict. For South Sudan, the CPA was primarily a means to pave the way to independence, not a means to promote democracy. In addition, the electoral process faced numerous structural difficulties relating to, for example, the demarcation of the north-south border, population census, voter registration, and the ongoing conflict in Darfur (Willis et al. 2009 ).
The elections were held for three levels of executive positions -President of Sudan, Typically, young men from the respective communities joined the rebellion to arm against rival communities. 7 Thus, dynamics related to rebellion and electoral competition is a factor that intensifies fighting between the communities.
The 2013 crisis
The Kiir, used a 'big-tent' policy, which -at least on paper -incorporated various factions within the armed forces, it did not constitute any real institutional changes (ICG 2014) .
The leader of the SPLM/A is set to preside over a sovereign government, and the territory it controls has significant oil resources and other important economic assets, including land. In rural South Sudan, control over land is economically vital for agriculturalists and pastoralists alike, and politicians in power have extensive power to determine landownership.
The stakes are augmented, as all subterranean natural resources belong to the central government (Mertenskoetter & Luak 2012) . Furthermore, corruption is widespread and the governance system has taken the form of a kleptocracy. Thus, political elites have extensive incentives to join rebellions, since it is beneficial to be part of the army. The lowest-ranking soldiers in the army are paid about 140 USD a month, which is a high salary considering that most of the population lives on less than 1 USD a day (Mamdani 2014) . Thus, the opportunity costs of joining a rebellion are low.
Second, the policy of co-optation is very expensive for the government to maintain.
Prior to the rebellion in mid-December 2013, it was estimated that 50% of the government budget was used to pay the armed forces (Mamdani 2014) . When the peace agreement was signed, about 200,000 Southerners were part of the Sudanese army and 'other armed groups', primarily militias that had fought on Khartoum's side during the war. Five years later this number was reduced by almost 90%, while at the same time the army numbers increased from about 50,000 to more than 300,000 (de Waal 2014). As most fighters in these militias were Nuer, it also created an army where a majority came from this community (ICG 2014).
Third, this policy has created a deeply divided army (ICG 2014) . Reconciliation between different factions has been hampered, and to a large extent the SPLA has become a coalition of ethnic militias rather than a national army (Mamdani 2014) . The deep division within the SPLA was a key factor in explaining the rapidity with which events unfolded in late 2013. Finally, the long history of war in the region has made retaliatory dynamics crucial, and many conflicts are retributions for earlier conflicts (Harragin 2011) . These dynamics make it easier for military 'strong men' to gain prestige. High-ranking officers within the army, as well as important politicians, often provide weapons to their community, which ensures that they remain in a powerful position (James Ninrew 2011 int.).
To conclude, the political landscape in South Sudan is dominated by actors associated with the previous civil war. In this milieu, political power struggles often become armed, and political entrepreneurs frequently use weapons in order to empower themselves. In the following, we will turn to examining the institutions in which these actors operate.
INSTITUTIONS: FEEBLE STATE AND PARTY INSTITUTIONS
When South Sudan gained autonomy it started off from a deplorable situation. Not only was the area shattered by decades of war -and animosities among actors and communities were high -but state structures and infrastructure were also extremely weak, or non-existent. In fact, Fourth, local government institutions are also very weak. This raises the risk for violence -communal conflicts in particular -as it undercuts local conflict resolution mechanisms that can solve such conflicts before they become violent (Brosché 2014) . The Government of South Sudan was established by the CPA and the Interim National Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, which both emphasise decentralisation of power and local democracy. The SPLM also employs a rhetoric that focuses on local governance (Rolandsen 2005) . However, such structures hardly exist in reality and the opportunities for local establishments to influence rules, or to control their execution, have been severely restricted (Rolandsen 2007) . In fact, in many areas of South Sudan no functional, legitimate, local governing institutions exist (Young 2010 ).
The move away from decentralisation was further established in the 2011 Transitional Constitution, which strengthened the national government at the expense of local structures (Radon & Logan 2014) . How the centre influences local policies in South Sudan can be illustrated by the way in which a governor is chosen. In the first years after the signing of the CPA, governors were not elected but directly appointed by the president (Rolandsen 2007 ). It was not until 2010 that the first election of a governor took place, and this process is still primarily part of Juba politics rather than part of the local political processes in the state. First, the three components of the theoretical framework -stakes, actors and institutions -have several interlinkages that are important for the violence-election nexus. One connection is that influential actors benefit from weak institutions, as they provide them with uncircumscribed power. This authority can be used for personal enrichment, either through corruption or salaries. Such rent-seeking behaviour among state actors may have negative consequences for public spending on social services, education and health, while payrolls to the public and security sector are over-spent (de Waal 2014) . Such patterns of distribution of state resources create grievances which may contribute to conflict and points to the challenges for both peace-building and state-building processes to take root.
Second, although we have primarily focused on violence arising from elite animosity, the analysis of actors, stakes and institutions reveals several links to local conflict dynamics (Kalyvas 2006) . Local grievances and ethnic identities have been used by both local and central elites, as a way of gaining political influence. The consequence has been raised competition over scarce resources and further militarisation in the communities. These dynamics have resulted in several armed insurgencies and violent communal conflicts, especially in Jonglei.
Third, the analysis provides insights into the debate on the timing of elections and the conditions for elections in the future. Previous research on peacebuilding has highlighted the pros and cons of early versus late elections in the aftermath of war (Brancanti & Snyder 2013; Paris 2004) . The stipulation of elections in the CPA was a way for the international community to legitimise the peace accord. However, such legitimisation did not take place, since the opposition boycotted the elections in the North and in the South the focus was on the referendum for independence. Thus, the 2010 elections illustrate the predicament that arises from elections being held before sufficient political structures are in place. In such contexts, electoral politics can be counterproductive and induce repression of the opposition, communal violence and armed rebellion.
A final insight relates to peace-building and state-building in a de facto one-party state.
In this context, concerned international and local actors need the monitor closely the intra-party politics of the dominant party. Since the SPLM dominates the political life in South Sudan and its presidential candidate is certain to become the head of state, the legitimacy of the electoral process depends on the internal processes of this party. However, the international community, including the US and many other western countries, has been reluctant to criticise the SPLM for shortcomings in the democratic process. This is because the international community appears to be stuck in a mind-set of supporting Juba and the SPLM after siding with them for decades in the North-South war. However, under circumstances where a state is completely dominated by one party the real competition will take place well in advance of the election. 2. For arguments about the conflict-mitigating and conflict-generating influence of electoral systems, see, for instance, Horowitz (2003) and Reilly & Reynolds (2000) .
3. For an analysis of the interlinkages between these types of conflict, see Brosché & Elfversson (2012) . 1953, 1958, 1965, 1967, 1968, and 1986 , but South
Sudan held multiparty elections in
Sudan did not constitute an autonomous political entity during any of these elections (Carter Center 2010). South Sudan was granted some autonomy between 1972 and 1983, but no multiparty elections took place during this time (Willis et al. 2009 ).
5. The CPA stipulated that elections were to be held in July 2009, but they were delayed. A prime reason was problems with the census. In addition, John Garang, the SPLM/A leader, died in a helicopter crash six months after the signing of the CPA, which impeded the implementation of the accord (LeRiche & Arnold 2012).
are used for governors. In the legislative elections for the assembly, a combination of first-pastthe-post votes and proportional representation was used. Of the seats, 60% were designated for single-member constituencies, and 40% were elected from closed party lists, of which 25%
were reserved for women and 15% for political parties (Carter Center 2010).
7. The supply of weapons also had an international dimension, as Sudan was the prime arms supplier to both Yauyau and Athor (Small Arms Survey 2013a).
